Key Insights
➩ China’s retaliatory tariffs reduced U.S. agricultural exports to China by an estimated $14.9 billion on an annualized basis over the one-year window from March 2025 through February 2026. The shortfall reflects the combined effect of the Fentanyl and Reciprocal tariff layers imposed since March 2025.
➩ The estimate is based on an econometric assessment that isolates the tariff effect. The econometric model controls for country-level importer and export supply and demand shocks, seasonality, and global commodity trends to identify the effect of the tariff. This separates the portion of the trade decline caused by the new Chinese tariffs from the portion caused by other factors moving at the same time.
➩ The impacts are broad-reaching across commodities. Soybeans account for approximately $6.8 billion, or roughly half of the total. Beef and cotton each contribute about $1.3 billion, tree nuts about $964 million, and corn another $333 million. The remainder is spread across coarse grains, pork, poultry, dairy, and a long tail of specialty categories.
➩ The tariff impact was largest in the middle of the period and has narrowed since the November 2025 Busan framework. The shortfall deepened sharply during the active-tariff months from March through November 2025, when the Reciprocal tariff peaked at 125 percent before the May Geneva agreement, and has narrowed since the November Truce suspended the heightened rates, though exports have not yet returned to 2024 levels.
➩ The annualized losses exceed the 2018/2019 retaliation. The annualized trade losses for the 2018/19 round, measured on the same basis, were approximately $10.6 billion; the 2025/26 figure of $14.9 billion is roughly 41 percent larger.
➩ Production concentration shapes the geographic pattern. Iowa, California, and Illinois each show the largest absolute exposure at approximately $1.2 billion, followed by Texas, Kansas, Nebraska, Minnesota, Missouri, Indiana, South Dakota, Ohio, Arkansas, and North Dakota. The Corn Belt and Great Plains dominate through soybeans and coarse grains, while California’s exposure reflects the tree-nut channel and Texas enters through cotton, beef, and coarse grains.
➩ The estimates measure lost exports to China, not lost exports overall. A portion of shipments that did not go to China in 2025 was sold into other markets instead, with U.S. agricultural exports to several other destinations rising during the year. The $14.9 billion figure is the size of the China-specific export loss, not a measure of net harm to U.S. farmers, which is smaller after accounting for redirected sales.
➩ Recent trade negotiations produced a new framework with specific bilateral commitments. The May 14–15, 2026 U.S.–China summit produced a framework that includes renewed export registrations for U.S. beef plants, resumed access for U.S. poultry from states deemed free of highly pathogenic avian influenza, and a mutual commitment to pursue further reciprocal tariff reductions on agricultural products. The summit also established two new bilateral bodies, a U.S.–China Board of Trade and a Board of Investment, to manage commerce going forward.
➩ The new framework, if fully implemented, would represent a substantial volume of bilateral trade. On May 17, the White House announced a Chinese commitment to purchase at least $17 billion of U.S. agricultural products annually in 2026, prorated, 2027, and 2028, on top of the existing Busan commitment of at least 25 million metric tons of U.S. soybeans annually. Combined with the soybean commitment valued at $11 to $13 billion at current prices, the announced $17 billion non-soybean target implies a floor of roughly $28 to $30 billion in annual U.S. agricultural shipments to China across 2026 through 2028.
Recommended Citation: Arita, S., Steinbach, S., and Zhuang, X. (2026). A One-Year Retrospective Assessment of China’s 2025/26 Retaliatory Tariffs on U.S. Agricultural Exports. NDSU Agricultural Trade Monitor 2026-05. Center for Agricultural Policy and Trade Studies, North Dakota State University. May 21, 2026. https://doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.401247

