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China Could Bypass U.S. Soybeans in 2025/26 and IEEPA Tariffs Raise Input Costs

Shawn Arita, Jiyeon Kim, Wuit Yi Lwin, Sandro Steinbach, Ming Wang, and Xiting Zhuang

Key Insights

➤ China could bypass U.S. soybeans this marketing year, if it is willing to pay the price. A larger Brazilian export supply, other alternative suppliers, and domestic stocks seem to provide enough flexibility to meet demand without U.S. supplies.


➤ Brazil and Other Exporters Could Cover Nearly All of China’s Soybean Demand. Based on 2018/19 trade war patterns, we project that non-U.S. suppliers could ship upwards of 107 MMTs to China in 2025/26, about 96% of projected import demand. Brazil’s share alone could rise to 93 MMTs.


➤ China could draw on stocks or adjust feed rations to close the gap. Estimates of China’s soybean stocks range widely from 12–44 MMT, which seems sufficient to cover the residual from non-U.S. suppliers (5 MMT shortfall). China could also reduce soybean meal use through ration reformulation or lower feeding intensity. Both approaches, however, involve risks associated with depleting reserves and potential productivity losses in the livestock sector. The critical test will come in December-January, when Brazilian supplies tighten before the new harvest—historically the period when U.S. soybeans have filled the gap.


➤ China May Be Willing to Absorb Modest Price Premiums. Current Chinese soybean import premiums are around $40/MT above U.S. offers, below the $90/MT+ premiums paid during the 2018/19 trade war. Chinese soybean meal and pork prices are also relatively low. China could eliminate U.S. soybean dependence, but it would require significant modifications in logistics and/or some demand suppression.


➤ Ultimately, whether China bypasses U.S. soybeans is a strategic choice beyond agriculture. While bypassing U.S. supplies would involve higher import costs and drawdowns of domestic reserves, these factors are likely secondary to the role soybean purchases play in China’s broader trade negotiations and strategic positioning vis-à-vis the United States.


➤ IEEPA Tariffs are Shifting Ag Input Trade Patterns. Following the imposition of 10%+ IEEPA tariffs in April 2025, imports of tariff-affected inputs have fallen sharply, while imports of non-affected inputs (e.g., USMCA, exempt products) have increased. During April–September 2025, nitrogen imports facing IEEPA tariffs declined 23% (580 kt), while nitrogen imports from zero-tariff countries surged 44% (464 kt) compared with the same period in 2024.


➤ Phosphate Imports Under Tariffs Have Also Declined. Imports of phosphate products subject to IEEPA tariffs fell by 47%, while exempt categories showed increases or smaller declines in comparison.


➤ IEEPA Tariffs Increased U.S. Fertilizer Costs. Comparing U.S.–Canada price spreads before and after the tariffs shows that the relative price gap widened, with some U.S. farmers now paying up to $34/MT more for DAP, $32/MT more for MAP, and $11/MT more for Urea.


➤ Global Price Run-Up Adds Pressure. Fertilizer prices have already experienced a significant run-up in 2025, particularly for MAP and DAP, primarily driven by global supply and demand factors rather than IEEPA tariffs. However, the tariffs are not helping: they have amplified regional price spreads and constrained importer flexibility.


➤ Importers Are Re-routing Supply Chains. Evidence suggests importers are increasingly sourcing from tariff-exempt or USMCA partner countries to manage costs, while growth in pesticide and seed imports reflects inelastic demand and existing supply commitments. Fertilizer imports from Russia have increased in 2025, since they are not subject to IEEPA tariffs. While this has helped fill short-term supply gaps, it has also made the U.S. more dependent on a geopolitically risky supplier.


Recommended Citation: Arita, S., Kim, J., Lwin, W. Y., Steinbach, S., Wang, M., and Zhuang, X. (2025). China Could Bypass U.S. Soybeans in 2025/26 and IEEPA Tariffs Raise Input Costs. NDSU Agricultural Trade Monitor 2025-10. Center for Agricultural Policy and Trade Studies, North Dakota State University. October 20, 2025. https://doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.373344

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