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When Good Years Become Rare: AIP Underwriting Results in High-Loss States

Writer: ARPC NDSU
ARPC NDSU
1 day ago
10 min read

By: Geoffrey Childress, Dylan Turner, and Francis Tsiboe


Private approved insurance providers (AIPs) sell and service federal crop insurance and keep part of the underwriting risk on the policies they write. In seven states (Texas, Washington, Florida, Arizona, New Mexico, Nevada and Utah), the business AIPs chose to keep in the commercial fund lost $525 million over 2020–2024, or 8.7% of the premium they retained, while the same business in the rest of the country gained $10.1 billion, roughly 19% of retained premium. Several of these states earned strong underwriting gains as recently as 2011–2015. Using RMA’s state reinsurance reports (USDA Risk Management Agency, 2026), this brief looks at when results in these states started to diverge from the rest of the country, how AIPs have responded, and how much room they have left to respond further.


One defining feature of the Federal Crop Insurance Program is that the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC) reinsures policies under the Standard Reinsurance Agreement (SRA), which requires AIPs to offer coverage to every eligible producer and service every policy they write. In return, the SRA pays AIPs an administrative and operating (A&O) subsidy to cover delivery costs and a share of underwriting gains as a return on the capital they put at risk. Because AIPs cannot modify the premium they charge, they instead can control their underwriting risk by placing policies in one of the two available reinsurance funds for each state (USDA Risk Management Agency, 2010; USDA Risk Management Agency, 2025b).


For policies placed in the “commercial fund,” the AIP retains 35–100% of premium and losses, whereas policies placed in the “assigned risk (AR) fund” have a fixed retention share of 20%. The gains and losses an AIP ends up with also differ by fund, with the AR fund offering more protective reinsurance terms that limit both on the retained share. The 2011 SRA also made commercial fund terms vary by geography, in part to make higher-risk states outside the Corn Belt more attractive to AIPs, by sorting states into three groups (Congressional Research Service, 2010). Group 1 (Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Minnesota, and Nebraska) has its own commercial fund terms. Group 2 includes the other major producing states, and Group 3 includes smaller states described as underserved. In general, AIPs are incentivized to place policies that are not expected to lead to underwriting gain into the AR fund. In contrast, policies that are likely to be profitable are typically placed in the commercial fund. This design works well when AIPs can earn underwriting gains regularly, but it can become limiting when losses recur, since an AIP can place at most 75% of its premium in a state in the AR fund. The remainder of this analysis measures commercial fund results with the gain rate (i.e., the AIPs’ underwriting gain or loss divided by the premium they retain). It focuses on seven states, referred to as the “flagged states,” that combine high shares of premium in the AR fund with weak underwriting results, indicating that these states may be close to reaching a limit on their ability to cede risk back to FCIC. Because the states were chosen based on recent results, part of their recent losses reflects that selection; more informative is how large and persistent those losses are and how different the same states looked a decade earlier.


Recent Trends


The flagged states’ poor performance is a relatively recent phenomenon. Over 2011–2015, the largest commercial fund losses were in the Corn Belt after the 2012 drought (Group 1 lost 4% of retained premium), while Washington, Florida, Arizona and Utah earned commercial fund gains of 22–38%. The 5-year gain rate for the flagged states as a group was still about 21% for the windows ending in 2016 and 2017 but fell to between −5% and −9% for every window ending in 2022 through 2025, while the comparison groups stayed between 15% and 31% (Figure 1). Every flagged state had a cumulative commercial fund loss over 2020–2024, led by Texas at $303 million (about 58% of the group total) and Washington at $150 million. As a group, the flagged states had a commercial fund gain in only one of those five years and in two of the five years in 2021–2025, while every comparison group gained in every year of both windows. Of the 39 other states reported in every year, only three gained in two or fewer of the five years in either window, compared with six of the seven flagged states. These infrequent gains matter because the commercial fund is where AIPs keep the risks they intend to earn underwriting profits on, which in turn offset whatever retained losses they expect in the AR fund.


Figure 1: Five-Year Commercial Fund Gain Rate, Flagged States, Windows Ending 2015–2025

Figure 1: Five-Year Commercial Fund Gain Rate, Flagged States, Windows Ending 2015–2025

Note: Cumulative AIP commercial fund gain before the NBQS over the five years ending in the year shown, divided by cumulative AIP-retained commercial premium. Nevada is reported separately starting in 2013, so its first five-year window ends in 2017.

Source: ARPC calculations using USDA Risk Management Agency State Reinsurance Reports.


This variation in gain rates is also evident in how AIPs manage risk in the flagged states by allocating premium across the two reinsurance funds. Group 1 states generally place less than 10% of premium in the AR fund, while the flagged states regularly place more than half and several reach 60–70%. Figure 2 shows how closely those fund allocation decisions track underwriting results, with a clear negative relationship between commercial fund gain rates and the share of gross premium allocated to the AR fund. States with AR shares above 40% tend to have commercial fund gain rates that are negative or, at best, near zero. The shaded area in the figure marks shares above 40% which is the same threshold used to flag states.


Figure 2: Assigned Risk Share and Commercial Fund Gain Rate by State, 2016–2025, 2020–2024 and 2021–2025

Figure 2: Assigned Risk Share and Commercial Fund Gain Rate by State, 2016–2025, 2020–2024 and 2021–2025

Note: Point size indicates gross premium volume.

Source: ARPC calculations using USDA Risk Management Agency State Reinsurance Reports.


Traditionally, shifting business to the AR fund has been an effective way for AIPs to limit their exposure in these states. However, as Figure 3 shows, the flagged states as a group had about half of their available AR allocation under the 75% cap left in 2020 but only 13% by 2025. Texas and Arizona had only 7–8% left statewide in 2025, compared with more than 80% in Group 1. Because these figures are state totals across all AIPs, some individual companies in these states may have already allocated the maximum possible premium to the AR fund and been forced to turn to second-best alternatives to manage underwriting risk. One such alternative is ceding part of their commercial fund premium to FCIC, which AIPs in the comparison groups rarely do. AIPs retain 83–87% of commercial fund premium in Arizona, about 90–94% in Nevada and Utah, and about 97–99% in New Mexico. In comparison, Texas retained 100% from 2017 through 2023 before falling to 96.4% in 2024 and 94.6% in 2025. The lower retention is consistent with some AIPs approaching the AR cap and ceding commercial fund premium instead, which limits their exposure to risks they would rather not keep.


Figure 3: Unused Assigned Risk Capacity in Flagged States, 2011–2025 (Percent of 75% Cap)

Figure 3: Unused Assigned Risk Capacity in Flagged States, 2011–2025 (Percent of 75% Cap)

Note: Unused capacity is one minus the AR share of gross premium divided by 75%, meaning 0% indicates the state as a whole has reached the cap.

Source: ARPC calculations using USDA Risk Management Agency State Reinsurance Reports.


Although the overall trend points to recurring and persistent losses in these states, the pattern does not hold in every year. Results in the flagged states, for instance, were generally good in the 2025 reinsurance year, but the gains were not enough to offset prior losses and were well below those elsewhere. AIPs in these states earned $127 million in the commercial fund, a 12.8% gain rate, compared with 29.8% in the rest of the country. At that pace, the group would need about three more years like 2025 to recover the rest of the 2020–2024 loss, while Washington would need about twenty. AIPs were also positioned to capture only part of the upside, having retained 46% of gross premium in the flagged states in 2025 compared with 84% elsewhere. Because AR designations are made before the year’s results are known, the record AR shares and higher Texas commercial fund cessions in 2025 are consistent with AIPs entering the year expecting these states to remain difficult places to earn underwriting gains, or with allocations that respond strongly to the losses of the preceding years.


Implications for Program Delivery


AIPs service every dollar of gross premium whether or not they ultimately take on its underwriting risk. For example, AIPs must pay agent commissions and cover any costs associated with loss adjustment regardless of which reinsurance fund the policy was in. Gain per dollar of gross premium is therefore a useful way to compare what a state returns to AIPs against the delivery expenses they pay and the A&O reimbursement they receive. Across both funds, AIPs lost 3.7 cents per dollar of gross premium in the flagged states in 2020–2024, compared with a gain of about 15 cents elsewhere. In Washington, AIPs lost about 11 cents per dollar in both 2020–2024 and 2021–2025. FCIC also takes a 6.5% net book quota share (NBQS) of each AIP’s underwriting result. Under the SRAs in effect for 2011–2025, in years when that share was a net gain for FCIC, FCIC returned 1.5 of the 6.5 percentage points to AIPs in proportion to their buy-up (non-CAT) premium in Group 3 states (USDA Risk Management Agency, 2024a). Nevada and Utah, the only Group 3 states among those flagged, appear positive on the gross premium measure only because of that distribution, which brought $61 million to Nevada and $23 million to Utah over 2016–2025.


When underwriting gains do not materialize, the A&O subsidy becomes the main source of any return an AIP earns in a state. Under the SRAs in effect for 2011–2025, FCIC paid additional A&O equal to 1.15% of net book premium on eligible policies in any state with a loss ratio above 1.2. This amount is not counted in the A&O used to set agent compensation limits (USDA Risk Management Agency, 2024a). However, A&O also has to pay for delivering the program, including agent commissions, loss adjustment, training and policy processing. The SRA limits agent compensation in each state to 80% of A&O unless the company earned an underwriting gain across its entire book for the year, in which case it may pay up to 100%. Even then, its total payments above 80% across all states cannot exceed that company-wide gain, net of the NBQS, processing fees and certain reinsurance costs (USDA Risk Management Agency, 2024a).


Losses in the flagged states therefore reduce the gains a company can share with agents everywhere, while companies that write mostly in these states may have little gain to share at all.


In that setting, an AIP can accept a lower return on the capital it commits to the state, cut delivery costs such as commissions and loss adjustment spending, or reduce its exposure. The last two choices would affect producers directly, through lower commissions for agents, less spending on claims service or fewer companies writing business in these states. However, this brief does not measure whether any of these has occurred.


Other Signs of Strain


Recent actions by RMA also implicitly acknowledge signs of this strain. In 2023, RMA confirmed that AIPs may cancel policies only with FCIC’s written consent (USDA Risk Management Agency, 2023). The SRA for the 2025 reinsurance year, which began July 1, 2024, required AIPs to report planned business reductions and agent terminations (USDA Risk Management Agency, 2024b). In March 2024, after some AIPs reduced business by terminating agents and cutting compensation, RMA directed AIPs to stop canceling agent contracts (USDA Risk Management Agency, 2024c). The last two measures were short-lived, with RMA lifting the directive that June after AIPs assured it that producers would not lose coverage (USDA Risk Management Agency, 2024d; USDA Risk Management Agency, 2024e). The reporting requirement in the 2025 SRA was also dropped in the 2026 SRA (USDA Risk Management Agency, 2025a). The timing coincides with the flagged states’ record AR shares and Texas’s first commercial fund cession since 2016. Most recently, section 10503 of P.L. 119-21, enacted in July 2025, added A&O for states with high loss ratios beginning with the 2026 reinsurance year.


Interpreting the Evidence


Whether these states have premium rates that are too low or have experienced a run of bad years is difficult to diagnose because samples are small and losses within a state are highly correlated. For example, a single drought or hurricane can hit most of a state’s insured acres in the same year, meaning a 5-year state record holds far fewer independent observations than its number of policies suggests. Almonds offer a recent example of how quickly loss experience can reverse in a geographically concentrated area like California, where almost all almonds are grown. From 2000 to 2021, the cumulative loss ratio for almonds was 0.42, with no 5-year window ending in that period above 0.52, which could naturally support the idea that premiums were set too high. However, extensive losses in 2022 and 2023, with annual loss ratios of 4.44 and 3.06, brought the cumulative 5-year loss ratio for almonds to 2.37 over 2021–2025. Over the full 2000–2025 record, the cumulative almond loss ratio is 0.97, very close to the actuarially fair loss ratio of 1.0 that premiums are designed to produce. The same caution applies to the flagged states in both directions, since Washington, Florida, Arizona and Utah earned commercial fund gains of 22–38% as recently as 2011–2015 and a single better year in 2025 is not enough to show that the losses that followed have ended.


Whether the financial strain described above has eased is still an open question, since the 2025 results were an improvement but did not offset the losses that came before them. AIPs’ risk-sharing choices for 2025 also suggest they expected these states to remain difficult places to maintain underwriting profits. If underwriting gains in these states continue to fall short of what AIPs earn elsewhere, the pressure on commissions, claims service and AIP participation may continue, with less room left in the AR fund to absorb it. Monitoring retention, AR use and participation by agents and companies in these states over the next few reinsurance years will help determine whether 2025 marked a turning point or a brief pause in an otherwise persistent trend.


References


Congressional Budget Office (2025). Estimated Budgetary Effects of Public Law 119-21, to Provide for Reconciliation Pursuant to Title II of H. Con. Res. 14, Relative to the Budget Enforcement Baseline for Consideration in the Senate. Cost estimate, Washington, DC. July 21, 2025; section detail in the accompanying spreadsheet. https://www.cbo.gov/publication/61569.


Congressional Research Service (2010). Renegotiation of the Standard Reinsurance Agreement (SRA) for Federal Crop Insurance. CRS Report R40966, Washington, DC, August 12. https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R40966.html.


USDA Risk Management Agency (2010). Standard Reinsurance Agreement: Side-by-Side Comparison of the 1998 SRA and the Final Draft 2011 SRA. Washington, DC, June. https://legacy.rma.usda.gov/news/2010/06/610sraside-by-side.pdf.


USDA Risk Management Agency (2023). Transparency Policy. Product Management Bulletin PM-23-064, Washington, DC, October 18. https://www.rma.usda.gov/policy-procedure/bulletins-memos/product-management-bulletin/2023/pm-23-064-transparency-policy.


USDA Risk Management Agency (2024a). 2025 Standard Reinsurance Agreement. Washington, DC, July 1. https://www.rma.usda.gov/sites/default/files/topics/25sra.pdf.


USDA Risk Management Agency (2024b). 2025 Standard Reinsurance Agreement and Livestock Price Reinsurance Agreement. Informational Memorandum IS-24-001, Washington, DC, March. https://www.rma.usda.gov/policy-procedure/bulletins-memos/informational-memorandum/2024/24-001-2025-standard-reinsurance.


USDA Risk Management Agency (2024c). Notice to Cease and Desist Agent/Agency Contract Cancellations. Manager’s Bulletin MGR-24-003, Washington, DC, March 15. https://www.rma.usda.gov/policy-procedure/bulletins-memos/managers-bulletin/2024/mgr-24-003-notice-cease-desist-agentagency.


USDA Risk Management Agency (2024d). Amended Notice to Cease and Desist. Manager’s Bulletin MGR-24-003.1, Washington, DC, June 3. https://rma.usda.gov/policy-procedure/bulletins-memos/managers-bulletin/2024/mgr-24-0031.


USDA Risk Management Agency (2024e). Amended Notice to Cease and Desist. Manager’s Bulletin MGR-24-003.2, Washington, DC, June 21. https://www.rma.usda.gov/policy-procedure/bulletins-memos/managers-bulletin/2024/mgr-24-0032-amended-notice-cease-desist.


USDA Risk Management Agency (2025a). 2026 Standard Reinsurance Agreement, Appendix II: Plan of Operations. Washington, DC, July 1. https://www.rma.usda.gov/sites/default/files/2025-03/SRA_AppendixII_2026.pdf.


USDA Risk Management Agency (2025b). Reinsurance Agreements. Web page, Washington, DC. https://www.rma.usda.gov/policy-procedure/reinsurance-agreements.


USDA Risk Management Agency (2026). State Reinsurance Reports, Reinsurance Years 2011–2025. Web page, Washington, DC. https://www.rma.usda.gov/tools-reports/reinsurance-reports.


Recommended Citation: Geoffrey Childress, Dylan Turner, and Francis Tsiboe (2026). When Good Years Become Rare: AIP Underwriting Results in High-Loss States. ARPC Brief 2026–26. Agricultural Risk Policy Center, North Dakota State University. November 18, 2026. https://doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.417441

 
 
 

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